Assurance of the Absence of Significant Undeclared Nuclear Activities

Current proposals for strengthening and streamlining NPT safeguards include various measures to give the Agency a capability to detect the presence of certain types of undeclared facilities. If the Agency can give a credible assurance that those facilities do not exist in a country, then the possibility opens up of reducing the intensity of conventional safeguards inspections, because certain diversion schemes become less credible. This paper reviews elements of a concept under which the Agency would acquire the capability to detect undeclared facilities through a two-stage process. First, the Agency would look for indications of illicit activities by analysing an enhanced information flow into the safeguards system. Then, where it finds such indications, the Agency would conduct inspections to confirm or refute them. The paper concludes this concept does have the potential to strengthen safeguards, but it does not obviate the need for continuing work to make safeguards more cost-effective.