Year
1995
Abstract
There is a clear need for a verification system to provide assurance to the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation commitments. International safeguards applied by the IAEA fulfill that need. But safeguards' effectiveness and the credibility of the assurances they provide have been the subject of discussion since their inception. And the credibility of those assurances is very important because, to fulfil their role as a confidencebuilding measure, international safeguards must not only be effective but also be perceived to be effective. IAEA NPT safeguards verification comprises a series of technical activities designed to provide assurance and deterrence, and to meet general objectives defined in INFCIRC/153 (corrected). Their scope and intensity are based on the hypothesis that in all States there exists (the same) diversion risk of low but non-zero probability. And, at least up to now', the L\\EA has worked on the basis that, to be credible, safeguards activities must be so thorough dial any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material would be detected with a high probability. Those tenets are now changing, not only because of the events in Iraq, but also because of the need to make cost-effective use of limited resources. And it would be desirable in principle to recognise that the majority of NPT Parties are genuinely committed to only peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, experience suggests that real proliferators do not find large scale diversion of safeguarded material an attractive route to take. This paper examines alternative ways of defining credible and effective international safeguards and suggests ways for reporting on the assurance they provide.