Safeguards Reform- A Decade On

Year
1999
Author(s)
Victor Bragin - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
John Carlson - Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
John Hill - Australian Safeguards Office
Abstract
It is almost ten years since the proposal at the 1990 NPT Review Conference that IAEA safeguards should be strengthened through greater use of special inspections. The need to address not only diversion of nuclear material from safeguarded activities, but also the possibility of clandestine nuclear activities wholly outside safeguards, was heavily underscored by subsequent revelations in Iraq. The safequards system has since been undergoing substantial development, diversifying from its traditional emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy to new verification methodologies. A major achievement was the adoption by the IAEA Board in 1997 of a model Additional Protocol, enhancing the IAEA's authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. At the political level, States are being urged to conclude protocols based on this model so that strengthened safeguards can be brought into general application without delay. At the practical level, substantial work is in progress to develop the new safeguards techniques required to meet effectiveness and efficiency objectives. The purpose of this paper is to outline these developments, to discuss current issues, and to consider where the safeguards system might progress from here.