THORP: The Lessons for Safeguards

Year
1993
Author(s)
R. W. Foulkes - British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd.
Roger Howsley - British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd.
S. Kaiser - Commission of the European Communities
G Andrew - UK Department of Trade and Industry
R. Schenkel - Commission of the European Communities
P. Chare - Commission of European Communities
H. G. WAGNER - COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
H. Nackaerts - Commission of the European Communitites
Abstract
The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield (UK) is planned to start operating in 1993. It has a design annual throughput of 1200 tes HM containing up to 12 tes of plutonium. The plant will be subject to comprehensive EURATOM safeguards involving significant new challenges for both the inspectorate and the operator, extending from plant design through construction to commissioning and operation. The legal approval procedures under Article 78(2) of the EURATOM Treaty are described together with the specific safeguards measures taken for THORP. A description is given of the many lessons learned over the six years to date of close BNFL/EURATOM interaction on the project The many new safeguards implementation features which have been developed in the areas of authentication, signal branching, in-line NDA, monitoring/logging systems, anomaly resolution, on-site independent DA, construction and commissioning verification and data handling are described. These advanced safeguards features will ensure that the plant, from irradiated fuel storage through reprocessing, finishing and product storage is subject to efficient and effective EURATOM multinational safeguards. The main lessons which can be learned from the project are discussed.