SHORT NOTICE RANDOM INSPECTIONS: RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS

Year
1990
Author(s)
J. Christian Kessler - U.S. Department of State
Carol Eberhard - U.S. Department of State
Abstract
Since the publication of the Special Safeguards Implementation Report in 1976, the question of criteria for evaluating, and thence for implementing safeguards has been given greater and greater focus, leading to a system today in which all implementation activities are guided by detailed criteria. Over the last decade a second important trend has also developed, strict limits (zero-real growth) on the resources available to the Agency for safeguarding despite growing responsibilities. Randomization is a well-established principle in verification activities, routinely applied in the sampling and measurement of items, to optimize inspection resource use. Recently a number of studies have considered applying this concept to inspection activities at a facility, to the timing of inspections, and even to which facilities are subject to inspection within some period of time. Short notice random inspection (SNRI) is an approach now being investigated by the IAEA for safeguards at on-load refuelled power reactors (in Canada) and an LEU fuel fabrication facility (in the U.S.). The basic concept derives from the limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA) inspection concept developed for gas centrifuge enrichment plants during the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). This paper will describe the concept of SNRIs as they have been conducted at a U.S. LEU fuel fabrication plant, identify some of the basic issues related to its application, and offer some views on its utility for (1) improving safeguards effectiveness, and (2) reducing the resource requirements for inspections at LEU fuel fabrication plants.