IAEA Safeguards for the Late 1990s

IAEA safeguards developed in their present form beginning after the IAEA was established in 1957, when the nuclear-weapon states began to make materials and technology available to other states for peaceful uses. Through the 1960s there was rapid growth in the nuclear programs of advanced countries, which could also be expected to have the earliest potential to develop nuclear weapons. Explicit bargains were reached by which materials and other assistance for peaceful uses would be provided in exchange for pledges to forego the acquisition of nuclear explosives, and the acceptance of safeguards to verify peaceful uses. The NPT and bilateral agreements were accepted on the basis of good-faith compliance with the bargain. While that offer was available to all, the major political concern was Germany and Japan, in the aftermath of WWII. The potential problem of clandestine treaty violation in some hypothetical future situation, where there might be little assurance of good faith, was of less immediate concern. Now, confidence in the advanced countries has been fully justified, while the spread of nuclear skills and means has placed nuclear weapons within reach of many other states. Recent developments in Iraq have raised a major problem with safeguards: the assumption of good-faith compliance is no longer valid. Major extensions of safeguards operations seem to be necessary; some are discussed in this paper.