Year
1995
Abstract
The operation of the Fuel conditioning Facility(1) (FCF) is based on the electrometallurgical processing of spent metallic reactor fuel. It differs significantly, therefore, from traditional PUREX process facilities in both processing technology and safeguards implications. For example, the fissile material is processed in FCF only in batches and is transferred within the facility only as solid, well-characterized items; there are no liquid streams containing fissile material within the facility, nor entering or leaving the facility. The analysis of a single batch lends itself also to an analytical relationship between the safeguards criteria, such as alarm limit, detection probability, and maximum significant amount of fissile material, and the accounting system's performance, as it is reflected in the variance associated with the estimate of the inventory difference. This relation, together with the sensitivity of the inventory difference to the uncertainties in the measurements, allows a thorough evaluation of the power of the accounting system. The system for the accountancy of the fissile material in the FCF has two main components: a system to gather and store information during the operation of the facility, and a system to interpret this information with regard to meeting safeguards criteria. These are described and the precision of the inventory closure over one batch evaluated.